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Prowling the seas today is the symbol of a new concept of sea power: the Polaris sub-
marine, not on station to control the seas but 
to extend control beyond the seas. 
In a 1954 PROCEEDINGS article, Professor 
Samuel P. Huntington proferred a new inis-
sion to the Navy.1 He contended that our ac-
tions in the Korean War and after implied a 
new course for sea power. Our powerful air 
strike forces, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediter-
ranean, and the Seventh Fleet off China all 
were elements of a Navy with the new role of 
extending naval power from the oceans and 
into the land masses-fighting notfor the sea 
but from the sea. Huntington argued that a 
new theory of a "transoceanic navy" had -
1 See Samuel P. Huntington, "National Policy and 
- the Transoceanic Navy," U. S. Naval Institute 
PROCEEDINGS, May 1954, p. 483. 
supplanted Mahan's traditional concept of 
control of the seas . . He had devastatingly 
assaulted the bedrock tenets of classical naval 
' 
strategy. · 
Other writers joined Huntington in arguing 
that sea power's cild mission was obsolete. 
Public statements by naval leaders often 
seemed to infer their agreement. Most impor-
tant of all, we in the Navy acted as though we 
agreed, devoting the preponderance of our 
thought and energy to new ways of spreading 
the weight of sea power over land. The expo-
nents of Huntington's new mission are very 
nearly right, and the more dangerous because 
there is so much truth in what they say. But in . 
this instance the difference between being \ 
right and nearly right is the difference of the 
six inches between the keel and the shoal- . 
the diffmnce between safety and calami~. I 
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There is ample exposition of the Trans-
oceanic Navy point of view. John]. Clark and 
Edwin B. Hewes went. to the heart of the 
matter: 
Historic naval functions remain ... [but) 
certain of the traditional missions, such as 
patrolling sea lanes and support of colonial 
dependencies, become less urgent. The role of 
the high seas policeman today affords few op-
portunities for exercise of naval skills. : .• On 
the other hand, the sea has become a means 
of dispersing the nation's armed might and of 
projecting its power over and onto the ad-
versary's land .mass.2 
They quote Timothy Shea thus: "The mission 
of protecting sea lanes continues in being, but 
the Navy's central missions have become to 
maximize its ability to project power from the 
sea over the land and to prevent the enemy 
from doing the same."3 
Typical of more popular writers, Ed Rees' 
condemnation was sharper in his book, The 
Sea and the Subs: "For Mahan, and the genera-
tions of Navy men who followed him and 
venerated his strategic concepts, regarded sea-
power as being essentially a thing of the sea, 
for use at sea-against enemies on the sea and 
near the sea . . . Mahan was not wrong in his 
day, a day which ended with the advent of 
nuclear technology. Those who were wrong 
were his followers who could not become 
leaders in the post-Mahan Navy." 
Huntington remained the most explicit and 
lucid. His remarks warranted, and re-
ceived, fullest attention. In his 1962 Naval 
Institute prize essay, "Naval Strategy and the 
New Frontier," Captain Carl H. Amme, 
, U. S. Navy, called Dr. Huntington's article, 
:~r, "perhaps one of the most important articles I ever . printed in the U. S. Na val Institute 
~ PROCEEDINGS." · 
l 
'· ·Huntington emphasized that the Navy's 
role was one which best supported national 
policy. Thus, during the 19th century period 
of the nation's westward expansion, the United 
'Su John J. Clark and Edwin B. Hewes, "A New 
Formula for Sea Power," U. S. Naval Institute PRO• 
cnomcs, August 1962, p. 31. 
'&e Tnnothy Shea, "Project Poseidon," U. S. 
Xaval Institute PROCEEDINGS, February 1961, p. 37. 
States could, and did, make do with a small 
Navy, without thought of controlling the seas. 
In the circumstances that then existed, a small 
Navy suited national policy. Near the end of 
the century we assumed responsibilities that 
entailed a measure of control of the seas and 
required a Fleet sufficient tq meet our new 
national policies. Our overseas responsibilities 
grew, and the Fleet along with them, until the 
culminant payoff of the battle fleetin World 
War II. Mahan's strategic doctrine, said 
Huntington, applied during this period when 
there' was . an "implicit and generally. unwrit-
ten assumption as to the existence of a multi-
sea power world." But, at the end of World 
War II, international power was distributed 
"not among a number of basically naval 
powers but rather between one nation and its 
allies which dominated the land masses of the 
globe and another nation and its allies which 
monopolized the world's oceans." Hunting-
ton contended that the traditional mission of 
controlling the seas was obsolete: Mahan's 
thought had been colored by his environment, · 
a sea power stage of world history. The-locale 
of the struggle had shifted to the narrow lands 
and narrow seas which lie between the oceans 
and the Eurasian heartland. Fleet actions 
were obsolete, and the strategic concept which 
emphasized the significance of naval engage-
ments was also obsolete. In the postwar period 
there had developed a new naval doctrine 
which realistically related the Navy to na-
tional goals. Huntington concluded, "For 
decades the eyes of the Navy have been turned 
outward to the ocean and the blue . water; 
now the Navy must reverse itself and look in-
land where its new objectives lie." 
In ampiification, he argued that submarine 
warfare is fundamentally a raiding operation. 
"Hnot effectively countered, it can of course 
have serious results. But antisubmarine war-
fare, altho~gh ·vitally important, can never 
become the primary mission of the · Navy." 
The ASW role, he claimed, is analogous to the 
.Army's protection of its depots and the Air 
Force's protection of its .airfields and plane 
factories. "It is a secondary mission" Dr. 
Huntington contended, !'the effective per-
formance of which, however, is essential to the 
39 
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competition. He igno«d the h~to,ic point ,1 
that as long as one power dominated the , 
oceans, it exploited that domination, as, for I 
example, the British had for a century after 
the Battle of Trafalgar. 
performance of the primary mission." 
Let us pinpoint the issue. On the one hand 
is the conservative view: Mahan's strategic 
doctrine, interpreted in the context of today's 
problems, remains fundamentally sound. The 
mission of a navy is to secure the seas, and, 
therefore, in the final analysis the proper .ob-
jective of our Navy is the enemy's navy. Any 
· other missions or responsibilities are subordi-
nate and determined with regard for the 
primary objective. On the other hand, the 
modern view: that among the military com-
plexities of today, a bald statement of objec-
tive such as to destroy the enemy's navy is at 
best an oversimplification, at worst an archaic 
misdirection of effort. In the modern view, 
the objective of a navy is to support national 
· policy by extending the weight of sea power 
beyond the sea into the very heartland of any 
potential enemy, and control of the seas is an 
ancillary objective. ·' 
T he error in the New Mission viewpoint derives from the conditions under which 
it was defined. Huntington's essay in 1954 was 
an inspiring vision for a frustrated Navy. 
With great effort and no little personal sacri-
fice, the Navy had managed to salvage a few 
elements of sea power, had mothballed ships, 
and kept a hard-pressed nucleus of profes-
sional personnel. There were a few so bold as 
to remind the nation that protected sea lanes 
were as important as ever. No one said this was 
wrong. Nobody seemed to care much either 
way, because the question was rhetorical. 
Then came the Korean War, the perfect 
illustration of the Navy's usefulness. The 
Korean War over, Dr .. Huntington spoke out 
for a new mission. He did the Navy a great 
service by opening our eyes to the breadth of 
the modern naval role in national defense. 
But if, in so doing, he persuaded us that a 
- mission to control the seas was obsolete, in the 
long run he did irreparable harm. For in his 
eyes Mahan's conception of sea power was 
valid "roughly from the middle of the Seven-
teenth Century to the middle of the Twentieth ' 
Century," but with American monopoliza-
tion of the world's oceans, it had become an 
anachronism of a bygone era. Huntington 
dismissed the idea that there might again be 
two powers in contention for the seas, and did 
not foresee the spectacularly swift return of 
Because for a brief decade our control of 1 
the seas has seemed secure, many are on the 
verge of forgetting that without it, a trans-
oceanic mission for the Navy, as defined by 
Professor Huntington, is impossible. The 
Transoceanic Navy theory is tied to the en-
vironment of its day. 
Momentary reflection on the consequences 
to the United States-of the unparalleled 
national disaster-ensuing from loss of a 
significant measure of oceanic domination in 
cold or hot war, suffices to destroy the concept 
of a new mission. Imagine an 'enemy in any 
garb-submarine, aircraft, mine, or missile 
cruiser-preventing egress of our Polaris sub-
marines from port, or destroying, chasing, or 
neutralizing the Sixth or Seventh Fleet; or an 
, enemy with the power to sustain his fleet 
freely off our coast; or an enemy quietly 
interdicting our prosaic oceanic trade, even _ 
of possessing the power of blockade or quaran-
tine which we now possess. To repeat these 
truths seems to belabor the obvious-except 
for the host of voices which say they are not 
only not obvious but not true. The survival 
of the United States and the Free World rests 
on our mutual support at sea, and on conclu-
sive, pervasive, convincing power to destroy 
any threat on or from the oceans. With power 
at sea in hand, then we are free to extend our 
power from the sea. 
To contend that, in• the strategic sense, sea power weighs more heavily on events 
ashore now than in the past is to miss the 
kernel of Mahan's teaching. Sea power has 
always served in a supporting role to decision 
on land. The essence of Mahan's thesis was 
that sea power contributed to, often deter-
mined, that decision. Some are unduly im:-
pressed with the modern role of sea power 
because it is so obvious. The sometimes less 
obvious but equally decisive effect that sea 
power has had in the past is missed by advo-
cates of a New Mission. 
The trend of increasing tactical interaction 
between sea and land forces continues-from 








rudimentary amphibious assaults, through 
the day of long-range rifle duels between ship 
and shore, and the day of airplanes extending 
the friction scores of miles from the coast, to 
the present when long-range missiles make 
the whole world the potential seat of land-sea 
conflict forecast by the British naval critic 
Fred T. Jane in 1906. * 
Part of the confusion probably lies in-·the 
issue of the proper demarcation between 
strategy and tactics today. Perhaps these words 
need redefinition. ICBM and IRBM missiles 
are genuinely strategic missiles because they 
serve a strategic purpose, but on the terrible 
day they are fired they become tactical weap-
ons employed on a world-wide battlefield. 
The ability to hit the enemy continually from 
farther and farther away is so fundamental 
that it has been called o:ne of the great tend-
encies of tactics. In the main, therefore, the 
recent ·extension of ballistic missiles to the 
radius of weapon action seems to continue 
this tactical evolution, albeit with strategic 
consequences as always, if-we accept the old 
definition of tactics as the employment of 
forces in combat. 
Perhaps it belabors semantics to raise the 
question at all. The important point is this: 
to subscribe to a modern philosophy that sea 
power is more effective today in the strategic 
sense is to say that the victory over the Span-
ish Armada, and the victories at Salamis, at 
Lepanto, at Lissa, at Santiago, and at 
Tsushima, were not decisive to the respective 
wars; that another outcome at Trafalgar, at 
the Virginia Capes, at Jutland, or in the 
Battle of the Atlantic would not have reversed 
• In an otherwise uninspiring book, Heresies of Sea 
Power, Jane was trying to explain why strategic con-
cepts had theretofore remained unchanged " ..• the 
geographical area expanded to meet certain condi-
tions, therefore many or most strategtcal problems are, 
or till quite recently were, the same thing over and 
over again upon a larger scale. But now that the geo-
graphical expansion has ceased with the limits of 
the world, now that owing to increased speed and 
radius, it is daily contracting in its relation to bel-
ligerents and destined to go on being contracted, is 
it certain that the great principles of strategy remain 
eternal? Will they exist at all when the radius of the 
ship has become of no account? Will there be any 
scope for strategical genius, or scope for anything 
save the original brute courage to face death more 
~eadily or more often than will the enemy: the fight-
mg requisite of the Homeric age-the integral factor 
of Fitness to Win?" 
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the outcome of each war. To say that· sea 
power has more impact on events ashore to-
day is to make light of the decisive nature of 
Roman sea power in the Punic Wars and to 
belittle the world-embracing influence of 
British sea power during the Seven Years' War 
and after. The amphibious assault on Quebec 
won England a continent; French sea power 
struck the final blow that took the richest part 
of the same continent away again. The stra-
tegic range of sea power has always been far-
ther than naval rifles have fired, the signifi-
cance has been deeper than the number of 
. soldiers and marines put onto the beach, and 
the results have been more enduring than the 
fleets which won them. 
The corollary to Mahan's definition of sea power and its mission is that the "proper" 
objective of a fleet is the destruction of the 
. enemy's fleet. " ... if the true end [of naval 
war] is to preponderate over the enemy's 
Fleet and so control the seas," wrote Mahan, 
"then the enemy's ships and fleets are the true 
objectives to be assailed on all occasions." To 
our good fortu_!le, the prospective enemy has 
defaulted in contention in the recent past, but 
this obscures rather than negates the primary 
objective and has allowed us to invest in 
al terna ti ves. 
That the enemy fleet may be composed of 
submarines, mines, or shore-based aircraft 
also tends to obscure our fleet's fundamental 
objective. Huntington and many others (per-
haps Mahan himself) took the reference to a 
'-'battle fleet" literally as a fleet of battleships 
and overlooked the subtlety that a battle 
fleet may be wooden three-deckers, a line of 
battleships, a carrier task force, or a fleet of 
submarines. It seems no coincidence that the 
newest HMS Dreadnought is a nuclear subma-
rine. Nor need the battle fleet be in battle line, 
nor even in dispersed formation covering 
10,000 square miles of ocean. It may be spread 
literally over the entire ocean, if that happens 
to be the optimal way at once to achieve con-
centration of fighting power and maximum · 
security. 
We are conditioned to regard the subma-
rine as a weapon of guerre de course. In two 
World Wars, submarines have served as raid~ 
ers. Like U. S. Navy frigates in the War of 
1812, and the CSS Alabama and Shenandoah in 
42 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 7964 
the Civil War, -submarines were used to inter-
dict sea lanes, disrupt communications, and 
bleed the enemy, without striking a mortal 
blow. Such is the common view. Closer to the 
truth, however, is that the German subma-
rine force, unaided, nearly bled Great Britain 
to death, and that, by 1945, U.S. submarines 
had literally isolated Japan. 
The future Soviet submarine threat sug-
gests itself as a direct challenge to control of 
the seas. The submarine fleet, supported by 
mines, shore-based aircraft, and s~rface ships, 
, is the enemy "battle line" today. The extent of 
the threat is subject to debate. But there can , 
be no question that a modern submarine 
force with little help can wage not a guerre de 
course but a contest for the sea itself. The sub-
_marine need no longer fight a guerrilla war. 
It is capable of forming an army in the field. 
T he United S_tates enjoys the advantages and suffers the dangers of a maritime 
power of a scope beyond that of Athens,Rome, 
and England. We have no choice but to ac-
cept the role. As the power on the seas, great 
benefits accrue to us. On the other hand, loss 
of only a measure of control in time or space 
bears grim consequences. The United States 
inherited Mahan's legacy when we came of 
age as the world's maritime power at the end 
of World War II. It is ironic that so many 
. have misread the terms of the will. At pre-
cisely the time when competition on the 
oceans reopens, we seem to turn our backs to 
the oceans, absorbed with deriving the bene-
fits of a control that we have come to take for 
granted, an absorption epitomized by the 
Polaris submarine. 
The Polaris submarine fleet is a great boon 
to the United States. In the first place, is its 
value as the best deterrent weapon produced 
to date, a value that needs no elaboration 
here; and its collateral value in a nuclear war, 
a value which is also sufficiently in the public 
eye. In the second place, the Polaris fleet has 
recaptured national interest in sea power. It 
is a shining example of the fruits of oceanic 
control that a maritime power enjoys. Un-
fortunately the luster of the Polaris jewel has 
distracted attention from the ring that secures 
, , it to the finger. 
The issue of the Transoceanic Navy versus 
"command of the sea" is considerably more 
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complex than the issue of Polaris submarines 
versus ASW forces. More of our naval effort 
contributes to the Transoceanic Navy mission 
than the constructing and operating of 41 
Polaris vessels. More is involved in controlling 
the seas than ASW destroyers, submarines, 
and aircraft alone. But · current national 
thought and naval effort are most striking and 
clear-cut in the contrast of the two, the former 
justified as a deterrent; the latter justified as a 
reply to the enemy "battle line." No expense 
and energy are spared in maintaining the sub-
marines on station. Polaris craft have peerless 
logistic support and first priority in any ship-
yard, necessarily at_ the expense of other pro-
grams. They are officered and manned by 
the best in the Navy, with sweeping personnel 
repercussions elsewhere. An unprecedented 
organization, with vast power to draw on the 
best scientific, engineering, and administra-
tive talent within the reach of the Navy, 
wedded the nuclear power submarine and the 
solid propellent rocket. The struggle to main-
tain and modernize our ASW forces could 
hardly · be in sharper contrast. Where would 
we stand if we had mounted an assault on the 
ASW problem with equivalent resources? 
Task Group Alfa is seven years old. It is a 
good bench mark to measure the beginning of 
a reviviscent ASW effort. Fruits of study and 
experiment are emerging: new tactics, new 
weapons, better aircraft, better ASW subma-
rines, better oceanographic data, and, soon, 
new ASW ships. We are recovering · lost 
ground. But we must continue to move, and 
with the urgency of conviction that control of 
the seas is the Navy's pre-eminent responsi-
bility. In particular, we need new, numerous, 
single-purpose ASW surface ships; · long-range 
better automated ASW aircraft; submarine ex-
perience in tactics of mutual support with 
other submarines, aircraft, and surface ships. 
We need more of our best scientific talent 
developing better ASW weapons, especially 
high-speed, deep-diving torpedoes; solving 
the classification problem; and continuing 
to improve our detection equipment. We 
have only so much talent and resources at our 
command. Much of the best has heretofore . 
been drawn elsewhere. 
Not that our emphasis in the recent past 
has been far wrong. As long as we could afford 
to take our basic mission in large part for 
granted we were free to exploit the derivative 
advantages of control of the sea in such mag-
nificent fashion. And this we did. But ~e have 
to pay a price for our Transoceanic Navy. The 
point is that many are ignorant of the price. 
Speaking of things that do not change is rash in these days of exponential break-
throughs and quantum jumps. It also seems a 
bit egocentric for Navy men to say there re-
mains a self-contained aspect of sea power-
tha t modern warfare is not entirely an inter-
action between arms of land, sea, air and 
space. The interaction exists, of course, but 
not so much in a new way as the old. The 
influence of modern sea power on events 
ashore is more apparent, and this is all to the 
good. The Polaris submarine has dramatized 
the strategic import of naval power in peace-
time, and this is also good. Not many years 
ago we heard that sea power had lost its 
vitality due to rail communications, then the 
Blitzkrieg, then the ascendance of land-based 
air power. None of these now already un-
fashionable points of view, nor the "new mis-
sion" point of view distinguish the essence of 
sea power and the often quiet, unspectacular, 
irresistible influence it has always had on 
events on land. Two centuries ago a French-
man defended his navy's policy of declining 
decisive combat. "The French Navy has 
always preferred," he said, "the glory of as-
suring or preserving a conquest to that more 
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brilliant perhaps, but actually less real, of tak-
ing some ships, and therein has approached 
more nearly the true end that has been pro-
posed in war." Some will say that we in the 
Navy prefer qrilliant action at sea, "the taking 
of ships," to our proper role. When we main-
tain that command of the sea is our para-
mount interest, we will be called old-fashioned 
not ready for the "post-Mahan" era. When 
our eyes scan the seas for signs of an enemy, it 
will be said that we seek to create the glories 
of bygone days. But there is little glory in the 
relentless pursuit of an unseen enemy in the 
sea. The Battle of the North .Atlantic was like 
the dismal trench warfare of World War I. 
Like the Western Front and like Jutland, 
it was a battle which might not win the 
war, but which if lost, would surely lose it. 
Sea power; then, is properly viewed as a 
means of influencing events ashore. What is 
improper is to hold that such a view is new. 
Our nation alone enjoys an ability to apply 
sea power on a world-wide scale, delicately 
or forcefully. Simultaneously we run the risks · 
that a maritime nation cannot avoid, which 
follow from any major loss of sea power. 
Hence, control of the seas is the very heart of 
U.S. national security. 
The battle fleet is the means to achieve and 
maintain control at sea. An essential part, if 
not the core of the battle fleet of 1965, is. our 
ASW forces. The United States can afford to 
slight the forces that-hold control of the seas, 
enjoying the fruits of their labors, as long as 
their grip is tight. But as we invest our energy 
in the Transoceanic Navy, we must have no 
doubt that the Oceanic Navy still comes first; 
when there is once again a challenge on the 
seas, that challenge will be met even at the 
expense of naval forces for deterrence or 
* 
limited war. · 
We must re-educate the nation concerning 
the meaning of sea power. The image of 
Polaris is in the public eye. Splendid as it is, 
vital though it be as a contribution to national 
defense, the1 Polaris weapons system symbol-
izes not a · new mission for sea power but the 
strength of the old. Control of the seas, in 
peace and war, is the real jewel whose value to 
the United States is inestimable, immeasure-
able, infinite. 
